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Mansion or Fortress?
The Legal Merits of Temporary Immunity from
Criminal Prosecution for Kentucky's Chief
Executive
Nick Jonesl
INTRODUCTION
W ITHOUT question, Presidents, governors and even mayors face intense
scrutiny for the actions they take both in their public and private
lives. The most obvious ramifications of such scrutiny are witnessed at
the ballot box. When the proper components coalesce, however, and the
perfect storm develops, a chief executive can arrive at litigation's doorstep.
And in the event an executive officer steps yet further beyond the bounds
of his or her public duty and breaches the very laws which comprise the
government that officer leads, the specter of prosecution emerges.
It is this last, worst-case scenario that will serve as the focus of this
Note. When in the course of public events, sitting chief executives find
themselves faced with criminal charges on the basis of allegedly improper
actions taken in their official capacities, the public may bear witness to
an invocation of executive immunity from prosecution. Such a maneuver
opens a veritable Pandora's box of both ethical dilemmas and constitutional
questions. Indeed, such an invocation can occur even at the highest level
of government! Despite the potential for such a watershed moment in
our nation's history, with respect to the potential invocation of immunity
from prosecution by a sitting President, only one significant scholarly
I J.D. expected 2008, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Lori Ringhand for her assistance in this project. The author also wishes to
thank his parents, without whose love and sacrifice none of this would be possible. Finally,
the author wishes to thank his wife-to-be, Rebecca, for her endless love and support, as well
as her remarkable willingness to endure his constant discussion of this project; her importance
to this project (and in general) simply cannot be confined to a footnote.
2 In the midst of the Watergate scandal, President Nixon invoked the immunity privilege
in his petition for certiorari in the case of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), arguing
that a sitting President could not be prosecuted. However, the issue was never decided by the
Supreme Court, as the case was resolved on other grounds. President Nixon's argument, and
thus the issue of immunity from prosecution for a sitting chief executive, has simply never
been directly addressed by the federal courts. Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the
King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 7, 8- 11, (1992) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
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article has been published on the topic.3 Ultimately, the issue is whether
or not a sitting chief executive is immune from criminal prosecution. In
spite of its obvious importance, from a legal standpoint the issue is all but
unresolved.
For a variety of reasons, this Note narrows the focus to sitting chief
executives at the state level (i.e., governors), and in particular, the
governorship of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Issues differ not only
between the President and governors generally, but even between governors
of different states, subject to different constitutions and statutes. As such,
it is most feasible to address the governorship of a single state. Still, with
respect to the powers accorded to state chief executives, state constitutions
are perhaps more similar than they are different, and thus many of the
conclusions drawn about the Kentucky governorship in this Note will
provide useful analogies for the governorships of other states when and if
they find themselves faced with the issue of criminal immunity.
Because of recent events in its history, Kentucky serves as an apt
laboratory for assessing the merits of allowing sitting governors to invoke
immunity from criminal prosecution. Discussed at length below, these
events thrust Kentucky, however briefly, into an intriguing and perhaps
unwelcome spotlight upon the inner workings of its constitutional
framework, specifically the interplay between the executive and judicial
branches of its government. As this Note will demonstrate, when faced
with a sitting governor's invocation of temporary immunity from criminal
prosecution, one Kentucky court simply reached the wrong conclusion.
That court's decision brought to the surface underlying questions
regarding the power actually accorded to Kentucky's governor, and, when
word spread throughout the national media, the power generally wielded
by a sitting chief executive. However, this Note does not seek to navigate
the thicket of questions of political philosophy potentially associated with
the issue of criminal immunity asserted on the basis of one's status as a
sitting governor-in particular, whether such immunity elevates a governor
to the status of a "king" or otherwise places that individual "above the
law."' 4 Though such ethereal questions undeniably lurk in the background
3 Seegenerally Freedman, supra note z.
4 In other words, this Note will place no focus on the weaker argument that a chief exec-
utive is entitled to immunity from prosecution based purely on the status of the office, derived
largely from the English common law's viewpoint that "the king ... is not only incapable of
doingwrong, but even ofthinkingwrong," which was "rejected at the birth of the Republic"-a
viewpoint that drives sovereign immunity, but has been soundly rejected in all other respects.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 (1997) (quoting Commentaries on the Laws of England,
I W. Blackstone, Commentaries 246). See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 , 415 (1979). As
such, rather than focus on the background issue of the deviation of the American republic
from the notion of a supreme monarch, this Note will simply look to existing American and
Kentucky law to see if there is any constitutional or American common law basis upon which
a Kentucky governor could be granted temporary immunity from prosecution for his or her of-
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of this issue, this Note seeks only to provide, to the extent feasible, a legal
answer to this question.
For essential perspective this Note will begin with a discussion of
the background events that led to the first invocation of the Governor's
temporary immunity from prosecution in Kentucky. Next, it will look
candidly at the brief and unembellished arguments posited by the special
judge who ultimately concluded that a sitting Kentucky governor is
immune from criminal prosecution. The following section will peer into
prior Kentucky history with respect to the indictment of some of its former
governors. This Note will then begin its legal analysis with discussion of
the relationship between criminal prosecution and impeachment under
both the Kentucky Constitution and its derivative case law. Striking at
the heart of the matter, the subsequent section will examine the immunity
issue in the context of the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the validity
of the analogy drawn by the Kentucky court between civil immunity and
criminal immunity both at the state and federal level. Looking beyond the
boundaries of Kentucky state law, the next portion of this Note explores
the legal wisdom and experience of other American states with respect to
the immunity issue. Finally, the analysis concludes with a brief discussion
of the normative realities of the "time infringement" so heavily relied upon
by the Kentucky court that granted temporary immunity from prosecution
to a sitting governor. Ultimately, as the sparse but clear legal evidence will
demonstrate, the position that a Kentucky governor cannot be prosecuted
during his or her tenure of office is untenable.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Investigation5
In May of 2005, Kentucky Attorney General Greg Stumbo opened what
would become a seventeen-month-long criminal investigation into the
hiring practices of Kentucky Governor Ernie Fletcher's Executive Branch.
The investigation stemmed from allegations that Fletcher's administration
had violated Kentucky's merit hiring law.6 Kentucky's merit hiring statute
ficial acts. See Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (noting that "[in] this country, the
development of the law of immunity for public officials has been the product of constitutional
provision as well as legislative and judicial processes").
5 Though Kentucky Governor Ernie Fletcher was not initially under criminal investiga-
tion or indictment, an explanation of the events preceding the eventual indictment of and
invocation of immunity by Governor Fletcher is necessary in order to place the allegations
against him in context. Thus, the following brief chronology is provided.
6 Stumbo elected to open the criminal investigation pursuant to charges brought by
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet employee Douglas Doerting, in which it was alleged that
Fletcher's administration had been hiring and firing executive cabinet employees on the
basis of their political affiliation, in violation of Kentucky's merit hiring laws. Fletcher v.
2007- 2oo8 ]
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strictly prohibits hiring for certain government positions on the basis of
political affiliation, or discriminating against current or potential employees
on the basis of political affiliation.7 Later that month Stumbo summoned
a grand jury in Franklin County that proceeded with the investigation.'
After several months of investigation, the grand jury initially issued nine
indictments against Kentucky executive cabinet employees.9
In response to the string of indictments, on August 29, 2005, Governor
Fletcher issued Executive Order 2005-924, setting forth a blanket pardon
of all individuals that either had been indicted or could potentially
be indicted as a result of the grand jury's investigation. I0 Despite the
prospective nature of Fletcher's blanket pardon, Stumbo made clear that
the grand jury still had the authority to issue more indictments pursuant to
the investigation," and that is precisely what the grand jury proceeded to
do.
l"
Recognizing that efforts to put a halt to the grand jury's investigation
had not succeeded, Governor Fletcher responded by petitioning the
Franklin Circuit Court to provide supplemental instructions to the grand
jury to make clear that, as a consequence of his pardon, it could no longer
issue indictments pursuant to the investigation. 3 This was refused, 4
Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Ky. 2006); Tom Loftus & Elisabeth J. Beardsley, Merit Report
Pans Fletcher COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Nov. I6, 2006, at IA; Merit Investigation; The
Fletcher Indictment; Timeine of the Merit System Investigation, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY),
May 12, 2006, at 7A.
7 Specifically, the relevant statute declares that "no person shall be appointed or pro-
moted to, or demoted or dismissed from, any position in the classified service, or in any way
favored or discriminated against with respect to employment in the classified services because
of his political or religious opinions or affiliations or ethnic origin or sex or disability." Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN § 18A.14o(I) (West 1997).
8 Graham, 192 S.W.3d at 355.
9 Id. at 355-
Io Id.; Ryan Alessi & Jack Brammer, Fletcher Pardons 9: Governor Says He Wants to End
'Game of Political Gotcha,' LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 30, 2005, at At [hereinafter Alessi
& Brammer, Fletcher Pardons 91. Governor Fletcher asserted that the investigation promul-
gated by Stumbo was "a political investigation." To wit, Fletcher issued the pardon as a
blanket pardon in an attempt to bring the merit hiring investigation to a halt by pardoning not
only those that had already been indicted, but also any individuals "who 'may be accused of
committing' a crime related to the investigation." However, Governor Fletcher elected not to
pardon himself from any potential indictment by the grand jury. Id.
I I Alessi & Brammer, Fletcher Pardons p, supra note Io.
12 The grand jury proceeded with its investigation and eventually issued new indict-
ments against other Kentucky executive branch employees. Graham, 192 S.W.3 d at 355.
13 Id. at 355.
14 The Franklin Circuit Court held that although Fletcher's pardon was permissible, a
supplemental instruction to the grand jury would be improper as an infringement upon the
duties of the grand jury. Thus, the trial court determined that the grand jury could continue
its investigation and could continue to issue indictments, even in light of the fact that such
indictments would "immediately be dismissed." Id. at 356.
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prompting Fletcher to seek a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, which likewise was refused.15 Fletcher promptly appealed,
resulting in the first major inquiry by the Supreme Court of Kentucky into
the Governor's constitutional powers as a consequence of the merit hiring
investigation. 6 Ultimately, the Supreme Court sided with the Governor,
17
providing Fletcher with his first legal (though perhaps not political) 8
victory since the commencement of the grand jury's investigation.
B. The Indictment of a Governor
The Graham decision had no impact 9 on the landmark action taken by
the Special Grand Jury only three days prior: Kentucky Governor Ernie
Fletcher was indicted for his alleged involvement in violations of Kentucky's
merit hiring laws. 0 In all, Fletcher faced "three misdemeanor charges of
i5 Id. at 356 (noting that the Court of Appeals found no obligation on the part of the
circuit court to issue the supplement to the grand jury instructions).
16 Id.
17 Among a litany of executive power issues resolved, the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Graham affirmed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that Kentucky governors
have the constitutional authority to issue blanket pardons. Id. at 358-359. The Court noted
that such pardons could be issued to a specified class of individuals. Id. at 358. The Court
then proceeded to concur with Fletcher and uphold the power of Kentucky governors to issue
pardons prior to indictment. Id. at 359. Finally, and of paramount importance to Fletcher, the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals by holding that, because pardoned individuals
cannot be criminally prosecuted, and because an indictment is part and parcel of the process
of criminal prosecution, the Franklin Circuit Court was required to dismiss the indictments
against all pardoned individuals and instruct the grand jury that it could no longer issue indict-
ments against pardoned individuals. Id. at 363-4.
18 Upon issuing the pardon, it was initially noted by political observers that Fletcher
could suffer dramatically from the decision to issue the pardon, given the public's propensity
to liken such tactics to President Gerald Ford's unpopular decision to pardon Richard Nixon
in 1974. Alessi & Brammer, Fletcher Pardons 9, supra note Io. Indeed, a little over two weeks
after Fletcher issued the blanket pardon, his approval rating dropped to below 40%. Tom
Loftus, Fletcher's Approval Rating Sinks to 38%, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), September
17, 2005, at IB.
19 As previously mentioned, Fletcher elected not to pardon himself, and declared after
his indictment that he had "no intention" of doing so. Ryan Alessi & Jack Brammer, Fletcher
Indicted, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 12, 2006, at AI. However, some believed that he
would elect to do so once he was actually indicted, and the belief that he would ultimately do
so may have actually fueled Attorney General Greg Stumbo's ultimate decision to enter into a
plea bargain agreement with Fletcher. See Joe Biesk, Fletcher Had "Patronage Machine:" Grand
Jury Reports Governor's Administration Violated State Hiring Laws, TlE ENQUIRER (Cincinnati),
Nov. 16, 2oo6.
2o Alessi & Brammer, Fletcher Indicted, supra note 19. The indictment received attention
on a national scale, indicating the widespread significance of the events that were to unfold.
See generally Ian Urbina, Indictment for Governor of Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A24.
Indeed, the decision to indict Fletcher, which notably came one year to the day the informa-
tion that would lead to the investigation was first provided to Stumbo, was likely rendered on
2007- 2oo8]J
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conspiracy, official misconduct and political discrimination."'" Specifically,
and much like the now-pardoned executive department employees before
him, Fletcher was charged with violating and conspiring to violate Kentucky
Revised Statutes section 18A.140, which requires that all state personnel
be hired on the basis of merit rather than political affiliation."2
It was perhaps the indictment, more than the charges per se, that startled
Kentuckians. Indeed, the charges were only misdemeanors, and as Stumbo
would later admit, the charges likely would have resulted only in a small
fine, with no concomitant jail time. 3 But the criminal classification of the
charges, when weighed against the significance of the official to which they
were directed, created a stigma that outweighed any actual penalty.
C. A Sign of Things to Come
Fletcher's only initial response was an attempt to get Attorney General
Greg Stumbo disqualified from participating in the investigation and
criminal prosecution.14 With his trial set," Governor Fletcher waited in
limbo for the next step in the criminal prosecution being pursued by the
May 12 because there is a one year statute of limitations on legal actions for violation of state
merit hiring laws. Alessi & Brammer, Fletcher Indicted, supra note 19.
21 Alessi & Brammer, Fletcher Indicted, supra note 19.
22 Text of The Indictment, and Responses, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 1z, zoo6, at
A 12. Among the various allegations that Fletcher violated Kentucky Revised Statutes sec-
tion I8A. 140, the indictment claimed that Fletcher had developed the "Governor's Personnel
Initiative" in order to "place specific non-merit political appointees.., of Governor Fletcher in
each cabinet of the executive branch of Kentucky state government," in particular Fletcher's
political supporters. Id. At its crux, the indictment then declares that "in furtherance of the
conspiracy, Gov. Ernie Fletcher and/or the co-conspirators and other known, unknown and
unindicted person(s) ordered, directed and/or approved the appointment, promotion, demo-
tion, transfer or dismissal of state merit employees based upon their political affiliation or
opinion...." Id.
23 Tom Loftus & Deborah Yetter, Fletcher Charges Dropped but Bickering Continues,
COURIER-JOURNAL, (Louisville, KY), Aug. 25, 2oo6, at IA.
24 Immediately upon being indicted, Fletcher's attorneys brought a motion in Franklin
Circuit Court to have Stumbo disqualified from the investigation on grounds that, because
he allegedly had aspirations for running for the governor's office in 2007, a conflict of interest
existed that precluded him from proceeding with the prosecution of the case in a fair man-
ner. Alessi & Brammer, Fletcher Indicted, supra note 19. Ultimately, Fletcher succeeded in
having Stumbo disqualified from the case, under a Kentucky statute declaring that "a public
servant who appears before a state agency 'shall avoid all conduct which might in any way
lead members of the general public to conclude that he is using his official position to further
his professional or private interest."' Jack Brammer, Stumbo Excludedfrom Team that Prosecutes
Fletcher: Defense Fails in Bid to Keep Out Entire Staff, Asks Dismissal, Cites Recent Legal Footnote,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jul. 8, 2oo6 [hereinafter Brammer, Stumbo Excluded].
25 Fletcher's trial was set to commence on November 8, 2oo6. Brammer, Stumbo
Excluded, supra note 24.
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State Attorney General's office. He would not have to wait long for a light
to appear at the end of the merit investigation tunnel.
Just six days after a not guilty plea was entered on his behalf,26 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky handed down an opinion that would provide
a potential defense to the charges the Governor found himself facing. In
Baker v. Fletcher, Supreme Court Chief Justice Joseph Lambert, writing
for the majority, commented in a footnote to the opinion that "there is a
strong argument in favor of barring criminal charges against a sitting chief
executive for actions taken while in office ... ."z' The opinion premises
this potential argument upon the assertion that "both the federal and
state constitutions allow for [a sitting chief executive's] impeachment
and, upon conviction, state he 'shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment."'' 5  Unsurprisingly (given the turmoil in the Governor's
mansion), the significant implications of the footnoted dictum 9 sparked
intense commentary throughout the Commonwealth. In the wake of the
26 The plea was entered on June 9, 2006. Jack Brammer, Fletcher's TnialSet To Start One
Day After Election Day, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jun. 10, 2oo6, at Ai.
27 Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589, 595 n. 16 (Ky. 2oo6).
28 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7).
29 The comment was obiter dictum not only to the case as a whole, but even to the foot-
note in which it is stated. The issue in Bakery. Fletcher was ultimately "whether the General
Assembly may retroactively suspend Ky. REV. STAT. section 18A.35 5 , a statute that provides
all employees of the Commonwealth of Kentucky an annual increment in their salaries of
not less than five percent." Id. at 591. The plaintiffs in the case sought relief from Governor
Fletcher in his official capacity on grounds that his predecessor, Paul Patton, had illegally
retroactively suspended section 18A.355. Id. The Court noted, however, that Patton had no
power to suspend a statute under the Kentucky Constitution, and thus his attempt had been
"void ab initio," meaning that Governor Fletcher (in his capacity as Governor) could not be
sued for damages. Id. at 593. Rather, the Court held that the plaintiff's action should actually
have been brought against the General Assembly. Id. Therefore, the majority noted that any
action against the legislators in the General Assembly for suspension of the statute would
be precluded by section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides for legislative im-
munity for actions taken on the floor of the General Assembly. Id. Footnote 16, in which the
controversial dictum appears, stems from a comment by the majority opinion that Kentucky's
constitutional legislative immunity provision was "not materially different from acknowl-
edged judicial and executive immunities, which, stated simply, stand for the proposition that
a judge or chief executive enjoys absolute immunity for actions taken in official capacities
while in office." Id. at 594. In a footnote to this remark, Chief Justice Lambert then discussed
briefly the background of both judicial and chief executive immunity both as United States
Supreme Court precedent and as Kentucky precedent. Id. at 595. After discussing Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), which provides official act civil immunity for Presidents and
former Presidents (disussed infra), and Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 51o (Ky. zoo ), from which
Kentucky's doctrine of chief executive absolute immunity from civil liability stems, Lambert
proceeds to make an arguably unnecessary reference to the "unsettled" argument that a chief
executive may enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. Id. Given that the case before the
Court in no manner dealt with executive immunity, let alone criminal prosecution of any sort,
it was unclear why immunity from criminal prosecution for a sitting chief executive was even
discussed, thus sparking the ensuing controversy.
2007-2008]
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opinion, some criticized the footnote on merely legal grounds, arguing
that such immunity was nowhere to be found in either the federal or state
constitution, and that no legal precedent for such immunity exists.30 Other
commentators even suggested that there was a corrupt relationship between
Lambert, a conservative justice, and Fletcher, a conservative governor,
which prompted the inclusion of the controversial, non-germane portion
of the footnote as a method to assist Fletcher in his legal defense.31
Regardless of the validity of the argument or the motives behind its
inclusion, it is clear that the promulgation of the dicta in Footnote 16 of
the Baker opinion opened the door to an argument for Fletcher's defense
attorneys in his impending prosecution. Rather than fight the charges
on their merits at trial, Fletcher's defense team would embark on a new
strategy: immunity from prosecution.
D. The Pitch and Catch
In July of 2006, Fletcher's attorneys, in part upon the weight of Baker's
Footnote 16,32 filed a ninety-six-page motion to dismiss in Franklin District
Court.33 Among other arguments, 34 the motion proposed, on Separation of
30 Experts at Odds with Lambert's Fletcher Footnote-Chief Justice: Governor CouldBe Immune
to Prosecution, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 26, 2oo6, at B I. In an article covering his
pending retirement from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Justice William Cooper described
the footnote as "kind of inane" and the legal argument as "specious." Ryan Alessi, Kentucky
Supreme Court Justice Cooper to Retire June 3o-2nd Judge to Step Down in a Month Cites Timing
for Better Medicare Benefits, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 22, 2006, at B I. It should be
noted, however, that despite the criticism of the footnote that would arise in its wake, Justice
Cooper's dissenting opinion in Baker makes no mention whatsoever of Footnote 16. See Baker,
204 S.W.3d at 598-6oI. In all likelihood (particularly given the biting nature of Cooper's sub-
sequent media criticism of the footnote) this indicates only the dicta nature of the footnote
comment, rather than acquiescence in its content.
31 Indeed, former Kentucky Supreme Court Chief Justice John Palmore described
Fletcher and Lambert as "hand and glove." Mutual Backscratch-Lambert, Fletcher Victims of
Coincidence? LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 20, 2006, at A8. Another editorial referred
to Footnote 16 as no less than "magical," and questioned whether or not that action (among
others) had damaged the credibility of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Larry Dale Keeling,
Fletcher's Mark: Blackberry Jam Stained Courts' Credibility, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Sept.
3, 2006, at Di. Indeed, likely in an effort to distance himself from the controversy created
by Lambert's dictum, Kentucky Supreme Court candidate Wil Schroder indicated that the
footnote "ought not to have been there" and gave the appearance that the Supreme Court
was becoming "more partisan." Schroderfor Kentucky Supreme Court, Editorial, THE ENQUIRER
(Cincinnati), Oct. 31, 2006, at 6B.
32 Ryan Alessi & Jack Brammer, Judge: Fletcher Cannot be Tried-Must be Impeached or Out
of Office First, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 12, 2006, at Ai.
33 Don't Try Fletcher His Attorneys Argue-Prosecution Called Unfair Since Others Did Same
Thing, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, July i8, 2oo6, at C2.
34 One of the primary arguments posited by Fletcher's defense team was that of"selec-
tive prosecution." Fletcher's attorneys argued that the same statute had been violated by
sitting democratic governors in prior terms, absent any prosecution or investigation of such
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Powers grounds, that a sitting Kentucky governor could not be prosecuted
for official actions.
35
On August 11, Special Judge David E. Melcher36 issued a ruling from
the bench3 7 that, while not agreeing to dismiss the case against Fletcher,
3
held, on grounds of immunity from prosecution for a sitting chief executive,
that the prosecution of Fletcher could not take place until he had been
impeached or had otherwise relinquished the office of Governor. 39 The
landmark nature of the decision even caught the attention of the national
media.1° The impact of the decision was tremendous from an immediate
standpoint, because the embattled Governor could not be prosecuted until
he was either impeached and removed or voted out of office.41 However,
the potential impact of the immunity granted reached far beyond Fletcher,
and that impact was immediately recognized by legal commentators.
4
1
employment practices. Thus, the motion argued that "'[olne of the most honored and re-
spected precepts in American jurisprudence is that a person cannot be singled out for prosecu-
tion under a law that, over many years, has not been enforced against anybody else."' Don't
Try Fletcher supra note 33.
35 Dan Hassert, A Legal Shield: Official Immunity Not One-Size-Fits-All; Judge: Trial Would
Be "Time Intrusion," THE KENTUCKY POST, Aug. 19, 2006, at 13A.
36 Fletcher's attorneys on May 16 filed a motion in Franklin District Court seeking the ap-
pointment of a special judge to replace the sitting district court judge that had been appointed
to Fletcher's case, on grounds that the judge bore a conflict of interest. Jack Brammer, Fletcher
Wants New Judge Assigned to Case: Lawyer Gives 3 Reasons; Says Prosecution Witness McCray is
Friend of Current Judge, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 17, zoo6. Fletcher's request was ul-
timately granted, when Chief Justice Joseph Lambert appointed David E. Melcher, a Family
Court judge from Cynthiana, Kentucky, to be the judge for Fletcher's case in the Franklin
District Court. Jack Brammer, Stumbo Excludedfrom Team that Prosecutes Fletcher: Defense Fails
in Bid to Keep Out Entire Staff, Asks Dismissal, Cites Recent Legal Footnote, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Jul. 8, 2oo6.
37 Alessi & Brammer, Judge: Fletcher Cannot be Tried, supra note 32.
38 The opinion found no merit to any of the grounds upon which Fletcher's attorneys
argued for dismissal. Tom Loftus, Fletcher's Choice: Trial Now or Later, THE COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, KY), Aug. 19, 2006, at I B.
39 Id.; Alessi & Brammer, Judge: Fletcher Cannot be Tried, supra note 32, at 5-6.
40 Theo Emery Ruling Postpones Trial of Kentucky Governor WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 12,
20o6, at Ao3; Judge Says Governor Can't Be Tried in Office, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006.
41 Fletcher praised the decision because, besides its obvious personal benefit, it argu-
ably served the "need of [Kentucky] to return to normalcy, and get back to the operation of
government as it should be without the cloud hanging over it of this unprecedented criminal
case." Don't Try Fletcher, supra note 33. Indeed, the argument that the process of conduct-
ing the criminal prosecution was overly time consuming was one of the primary arguments
posited by Judge Melcher in allowing Fletcher temporary executive immunity from prosecu-
tion. Hassert, supra note 35. See also discussion of the court's arguments, infra notes 49-57 and
accompanying text.
42 Experts reacting to the legal ruling argued that Melcher "confused civil immunity
... with criminal immunity .... Hassert, supra note 35. Others described the ruling as creat-
ing a "'new legal doctrine"' that "had no basis in either federal or state law." Id.
2007- 2oo8 ]
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E. A Can of Worms Never to Be Sealed
In the aftermath of the immunity decision, there was an outcry by some for
an appeal of the decision. 43 In particular, there was a sense among critics of
the opinion that, if the issue was never resolved by Kentucky's appellate
courts, future officeholders would be uncertain of the rules. 4  Indeed,
without a decision by a higher Kentucky court or the guidance of scholarly
commentary, officeholders in Kentucky had only the authority of a lower
county court and a point of dictum in a footnote to an unrelated Kentucky
Supreme Court case upon which to rely.
However, the appeal was never to be.45 Instead, on August 24, thirteen
days after the immunity decision was initially handed down, Governor
Fletcher reached an agreement with the prosecution to drop the charges
as part of a settlement agreement. 46 All the charges against Fletcher were
dismissed,47 bringing the investigation to a close and leaving no opportunity
for an appeal of the previous executive immunity decision.48 The validity
of immunity from prosecution for sitting governors in Kentucky was
ultimately left unresolved. Despite the disquieting nature of the resulting
constitutional uncertainty, the Fletcher investigation did open the lid on
an intellectually intriguing, largely unexplored, and practically important
constitutional issue.
II. THE IMMUNITY DECISION 49
As an initial point, the decision rendered by the court was notable for what
it did not hold as well as what it ultimately did conclude. The opinion
43 See generally Elizabeth J. Beardsley, Lawmaker Urges Appeal of Fletcher Immunity,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Aug. IS, 2oo6.
44 Id. Others felt that case law needed to be developed if nothing else because "[tihis is
too important of an issue for government-not just state employees, but government-to be
decided by a district court." Id.
45 The Attorney General's office made clear from the outset that they were undecided as
to whether or not they would appeal the immunity decision. Id.
46 Jack Brammer, Deal Ends Indictments Against Governor: Fletcher Stumbo Announce
Settlement, LEXINGTON HERALD--LEADER, Aug. 25, 2006.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Unfortunately, the case file for Commonwealth v. Fletcher has been sealed by court order.
Case No. o6-M-o812 (Franklin Dist. Ct., Aug. 22, zoo6). Out of an abundance of caution, no
direct citations to the opinion have been made in this Note. Instead, the Note focuses on
media excerpts from the written opinion, in particular Dan Hassert's article from the Kentucky
Post, supra note 35. This is justifiable in light of the fact that the primary purpose of this Note
is not to analyze and criticize the reasoning of the opinion of a Kentucky trial court, but rather
to explore the issue of immunity from prosecution for sitting governors generally. To wit, the
opinion itself is merely a launchpad for the exploration of that issue, and a very appropriate
one at that.
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madeclear that there is no criminal immunity, even for a sitting chief
executive, for unofficial acts (i.e., a DUI, larceny charges, murder, etc.).5"
Furthermore, the immunity granted by the court was only temporary in
nature; it was not a grant of absolute immunity from prosecution."1 The
effect was only to delay what would eventually have resulted in Fletcher's
prosecution, absent the subsequent settlement agreement. Finally, the
opinion makes clear that a sitting governor may still be indicted, but the
charges simply cannot be "pursued" until the Governor is out of office.
5
1
Nonetheless, the supporting arguments set forth in the written opinion
provide a useful roadmap for analyzing the arguments, both for and against,
the temporary criminal immunity granted in the Fletcher case. The court
relied chiefly on a combination of inapplicable United States Supreme
Court case law and a questionable interpretation of state constitutional
law to arrive at the conclusion that a sitting Kentucky governor cannot be
prosecuted for official acts.53
First, the court determined that a sitting Kentucky governor cannot
be prosecuted because of the "time intrusion" it would impose on the
Governor's pursuit of his constitutional duties.-' For this, the opinion relies
primarily on the "balancing test" elucidated by the United States Supreme
Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, wherein the Court granted the President
absolute immunity from civil claims based on his or her official actions.55
The court clearly felt that the time intrusion of pursuing a prosecution
of Governor Fletcher simply outweighed the importance of enforcing the
merit system statute.
The court's opinion also relies heavily on the separate and distinct
argument that the prosecution of a sitting governor cannot take place prior
to impeachment and removal from office. This inference, drawn from
50 The court found that "unofficial misconduct can be pursued against any citizen (in-
cluding the governor) at anytime, if the statute of limitations is satisfied." Hassert, supra note
35-
51 Id. The opinion makes clear that the prosecution cannot proceed until the Governor
"is not in office." However, the Governor was provided the option of waiving his immunity
protection. Id.
52 Id.
53 It should be noted that it does not appear that the trial court relied on "Footnote 16"
from Baker Still, it is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court's footnoted dictum had no
influence upon the Franklin District Court's opinion, given the proximity between the two
opinions, and given that it represented the only useful direct guidance on the subject provid-
ed by Kentucky's appellate courts. Indeed, it was relied heavily upon by Fletcher's attorneys
in their motion to dismiss. See Alessi & Brammer, Judge: Fletcher Cannot be Tried, supra note 32.
It is clear that the media believed that the immunity decision was influenced in large part by
Footnote 16. Keeling, supra note 3 1.
54 Hassert, supra note 35.
55 Id. See infra notes 96-io8 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nixon v. Fitzgerald
and its inapplicability to the matter of criminal prosecutions.
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section 68 of the Kentucky Constitution, is clearly not supported by its text
or interpretative case law, as is discussed infra.
56
Finally, the court notes that the immunity rendered was required by
the "Separation of Powers Doctrine.""7 Presumably, the content of this
argument is that the prosecution of the case would represent an intrusion
of Kentucky's judicial branch into the functioning of the executive branch
by virtue of the aforementioned "time infringement," violating the general
Separation of Powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution, sections 27
and 28.58
Ultimately, the aforementioned arguments are untenable on
constitutional grounds, and are without precedent in the case law of the
Commonwealth, the federal courts, or any other states. This Note seeks to
explore the sources of law upon which the trial court relied, along with other
possible sources of the immunity granted to Kentucky's Chief Executive.
III. A THRESHOLD MATTER: KENTUCKY'S HISTORY
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF GOVERNORS
With the indictment of Governor Ernie Fletcher in May of 2006, Kentucky
witnessed only the third indictment of a sitting governor in its history."
With so little direct guidance on the matter, any mirroring historical fact
pattern is worth considering. Unfortunately, because it appears that neither
governor elected to raise immunity as a defense, the other indictments
provide little in the way of guidance with respect to the issue of executive
immunity from prosecution.
Governor William Sylvester Taylor was indicted at the turn of the
twentieth century as an accessory to the murder of his opponent in the
previous 1899 gubernatorial election, William Goebel. 60 Taylor fled to
Indiana after he was voted out of office by the Kentucky legislature and
56 Id. Section 68 declares that "[tihe Governor and all civil officers shall be liable to
impeachment for any misdemeanors in office; but judgment in such cases shall not extend
further than removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit
under this Commonwealth; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be subject and liable
to indictment, trial and punishment by law." Ky. CONST. § 68. The court's opinion gives
little explanation of how, precisely, section 68 requires impeachment prior to prosecution,
stating simply that doing so would "put the cart before the horse and violate our constitution."
Hassert, supra note 35. Nonetheless, and as is discussed in infra notes 70 & 72, the inference
must have been that because this section mentions impeachment first, leaving indictment
and prosecution to be pursued in spite of a conviction upon impeachment, the intent of the
drafters was to require impeachment first, and then actual prosecution.
57 Hassert, supra note 35.
58 Seegenerally Ky. CONST. §§ 27, 28.
59 Ryan Alessi, Kentucky Governor Not First to Be Indicted: "We're Just Joining the Crowd,"
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 21, 2oo6, at A I.
6o JAMES C. KLOTFER, William Sylvester Taylor, in KENTUCKY'S GOVERNORS: UPDATED
EDITION 133 (Lowell H. Harrison ed., zoo4).
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was replaced by Goebel (who would die only days later), having officially
served only fifty days as Governor.61 Despite attempts to extradite him,
Taylor would not return to Kentucky until after his pardon in 1909. Thus
the Governor never stood trial, providing him no opportunity to bring an
immunity argument to fruition.
6
1
Governor Flem D. Sampson, elected in 1927,63 was indicted by a
Franklin County grand jury on charges that he accepted illegal gifts from
textbook manufacturers.64 However, the charges against Sampson were
dismissed. The immunity defense was apparently never invoked.6' Once
again, even if Sampson had invoked immunity, the immunity provided to
Fletcher would have been inapplicable because the charges against him
clearly did not stem from official acts. Thus, though Fletcher was not the
first Kentucky governor to be indicted, he is the only indicted governor that
even could have qualified for the temporary, official act immunity provided
by the Franklin District Court. As such, Fletcher's case is a unique one,
and without precedent in Kentucky's legal and political history.
IV. IMPEACHMENT AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
A. Commonwealth v. Rowe
Kentucky case law does not support the interpretation of section 68 of the
Kentucky Constitution that provided a basis upon which the court relied
in providing the Governor with temporary immunity. Commonwealth v.
Rowe involved the prosecution of a commonwealth's attorney on charges
of bribery.6 The defendant, similar to Fletcher, argued that under section
68 of the Kentucky Constitution, "a commonwealth's attorney cannot
be indicted for malfeasance in office until impeachment and conviction
thereon. ' 67 The Court of Appeals (Kentucky's highest court at the time)
did not agree with this interpretation of section 68, finding instead that "the
provision has never been understood to protect state officers from criminal
61 Id.
62 Id. Even if Taylor had stood trial, it would have been after he had been removed
as governor, and the charges against him did not pertain to official acts, as was the case with
Fletcher.
63 Id. at 161.
64 Id. at 162. Apparently, Governor Sampson was closely allied with southern textbook
manufacturers, and had proposed a plan to provide free textbooks, a campaign promise that
was ratified by the legislature, but for which no money was appropriated. Id. at 161-162.
65 Id. at 162.
66 Rowe, a Commonwealth's Attorney, had been paid $50 to dismiss an indictment
against two defendants that he was charged with prosecuting. Commonwealth v. Rowe, 66
S.W. 29, 29-30 (Ky. 1902).
67 Id. at 30.
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punishment until impeachment and removal from office."'  Rather, the
Court noted that the purpose of impeachment is merely to remove the officer
from office, not to serve as a form of criminal punishment. Furthermore,
such a construction of section 68 would operate to "defy" the framers of the
Kentucky Constitution, who never intended that those who were sworn to
uphold the law could obtain a form of immunity by virtue of their status
serving an office whose duty they failed to fulfill.
69
Applying a textual analysis, the court likewise found no basis for the
argument that section 68 required impeachment and removal prior to
prosecution, noting that the purpose of section 68 was simply to address
impeachment. The inclusion of the words "but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be subject to indictment, trial and punishment by law" served
only to make clear that prosecution, even in the face of an impeachment
trial in the Senate, would not be a form of double jeopardy,70 which is strictly
prohibited by the Kentucky Constitution.71 Thus, at least as of the turn of
the twentieth century, the understanding of Kentucky's highest court was
that impeachment, conviction and removal from office were not conditions
precedent to the criminal prosecution of a state officer.7"
B. Commonwealth v. Stump
Rowe was effectively reaffirmed in a different context in Commonwealth
v. Stump. In that case, a Commonwealth's Attorney who was disbarred
argued that his disqualification from serving as a member of the bar ipso
facto removed him as a state officer. Thus, he argued, this required that
impeachment proceedings be held before his disqualification and removal.73
The court analogized the argument to that posited in Rowe, and reiterated
the purpose behind section 68 that the Rowe court had recognized.7 4 In
68 Id. at 30 (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 9 Ky. L. Rptr. 289 (Ky. 1881)).
69 Id. at 30.
70 Id. Indeed, despite the fact that the words of section 68 say that "the party convicted' is
still subject to indictment and prosecution, the use of the word "convicted" seems on a clear
reading to indicate that, even though the defendant has suffered conviction through impeach-
ment, they may still be criminally prosecuted because the punishment for an impeachment
conviction "shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office or honor." Ky. CONST. § 68. Thus, the purpose was clearly not to imply that only those
convicted by impeachment proceedings could then be prosecuted.
71 K. CONST. § 13.
72 See Rowe, 66 S.W. at 3o . The court did not in any manner limit its analysis to the pros-
ecution of commonwealth's attorneys. Indeed, in discussing the unprecedented nature of
such immunity, the court noted that "[o]ther offenders against the criminal law have no such
immunity." Id. Though this latter remark is hardly dispositive given its brief nature, it seems
likely that had the court contemplated immunity such as that granted to Governor Fletcher
they would have mentioned it.
73 Commonwealth v. Stump, 57 S.W.zd 524, 524 (Ky. 1933).
74 Id. at 526 (noting that "the only purpose intended to be accomplished by the employ-
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the same manner that section 68 is not meant to employ impeachment
proceedings as a method to postpone or curtail a criminal prosecution,
section 68 is not meant to hamper "the power and authority of the courts to
cancel and annul such privilege [of admission to the bar]. 75
The fact that Commonwealth v. Fletcher involved the prosecution of a
sitting governor rather than the prosecution or disbarment of a lower-level
state official (as in Rowe and Stump) does not somehow alter the meaning
of section 68 when it is instead applied to the Governor. To the extent
that Separation of Powers concerns might be implicated as a result of it
being applied to the Governor, this does not so much refute the Stump or
Rowe line of cases as it simply finds that alternative grounds for immunity
exist. Clearly, the Separation of Powers issue would have no bearing on
the meaning of the language of section 68 as intended by its framers or
interpreted by the courts; nothing in the text indicates that a different
meaning was intended with respect to the office of Governor. In sum,
it seems clear that nothing in Kentucky case law supports a finding that
section 68 requires impeachment, conviction, and removal from office prior
to criminal prosecution for any state officer, including the Governor.
C. Impeachment Relative to Prosecution Under the Federal Constitution
A virtually identical provision of the United States Constitution has been
similarly construed in the context of a federal prosecution of a former state
governor. In UnitedStates v. Isaacs former Illinois governor Otto Kerner was
convicted in federal court on charges of accepting bribes, mail fraud, and
tax evasion (among other violations of federal criminal statutes).76 Kerner
ment of that language [of the last clause in section 68] was to prevent the judgment in an
impeachment prosecution from becoming a bar to criminal prosecution based upon the same
acts of omission or commission that were investigated and determined in the impeachment
proceedings").
75 Id.
76 United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1973). Kerner was not the
Governor of Illinois at the time of his trial and conviction (Feb. 1973), but rather was convict-
ed for activities that took place in part during his tenure as governor from 1961-1968. At the
time of his trial and conviction, Kerner was a federal judge, and thus the impeachment argu-
ment related not to his time as Illinois Governor, but rather to his position as a federal judge.
Id. at 1140. Given that the constitutional provision being construed is practically identical to
that interpreted by Kentucky's highest court in Rowe and Stump, the fact that Kerner was not
in the governor's mansion at the time does not diminish the relevance of the case.
Among other arguments, Kerner claimed immunity from prosecution on grounds that, be-
cause criminal conviction would remove him from office, and because only Congress has the
power to impeach and remove, his conviction before a court was improper. Id. at i 140-1141.
In a review of pertinent case law, much of which is analyzed infra, the court found that the
framers had no intent of establishing an immunity provision that allowed a federal judge to
claim immunity from criminal prosecution by virtue of his or her office, Id. at 1142, and that
"whatever immunities or privileges the Constitution confers for the purpose of assuring the
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argued that under Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the federal Constitution, 77
he could not be criminally prosecuted prior to impeachment and removal
from his judicial office. Construing the provision similarly to the construction
applied to section 68 of the Kentucky Constitution by Kentucky's high
court decades prior, the Seventh Circuit held that the clause "does not
mean that the person may not be indicted and tried without impeachment
first."7 8 Rather, the court determined that the clause was probably included
to ensure that constitutional principles prohibiting double jeopardy would
not operate to preclude criminal prosecution subsequent to a conviction
through impeachment. 9 Thus, concluded the court, Kerner was subject to
indictment and criminal prosecution before impeachment.8"
V. A MISPLACED ANALOGY: CIVIL IMMUNITY UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
A. The Separation of Powers Provisions of the Kentucky Constitution
Sections 2781 and 2882 of the Kentucky Constitution, Kentucky's primary
separations of powers provisions, arguably could provide some underlying
foundation for a decision granting the Governor temporary immunity from
prosecution. In any event, they at least provide a solid starting point for
an analysis of the availability of such immunity. It seems clear from the
language of the opinion that the court's invocation of the Separation of
Powers Doctrine is premised upon the argument that allowing a prosecution
of a sitting Kentucky governor would unduly infringe upon the ability of
the chief executive to perform the duties of his or her office because of the
inevitable intrusion on the Governor's time. 83 As such, the court concluded
independence of the co-equal branches of government, they do not exempt the members of
those branches 'from the operation of the ordinary criminal laws."' Id. at 1144.
77 "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
78 Isaacs, 493 E2d at 1142.
79 Id.
8o Id. at I I44.
81 Section 27 provides that "[tihe powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to
a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are
executive, to another; and those which are judicial to another." Ky. CONST. § 27.
82 Section z8 provides that "[no person, or collection of persons, being of one of those
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the
instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
83 Hassert, supra note 35.
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that the Separation of Powers Doctrine of the Kentucky Constitution
prohibited the prosecution of a sitting Kentucky governor.A4
In addition, it is clear that both sections 69 and 81 of the Kentucky
Constitution, on their face, potentially provide arguments for the governor's
temporary immunity from prosecution. Section 69, borrowing from Article
II of the federal Constitution, declares that "[t]he supreme executive
power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Chief Magistrate ...
the 'Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.' ' '85 Armed with this
authority, section 81 also borrows from Article II in declaring that the
Governor "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."' 6 Combined
with the general Separation of Powers provisions (sections 27 and 28) of
the Kentucky Constitution, the language of these two sections obviously
leaves the door open to an argument that the criminal prosecution of a
sitting Kentucky governor would so unduly infringe upon his "supreme
executive power" to "take care that the law's be faithfully executed" as to
violate the general Separation of Powers Doctrine expressly established by
Kentucky's Constitution. Such an argument, purely in the abstract, is not
difficult to conceive, and likely presents the best argument available to a
sitting Kentucky governor invoking immunity from prosecution.
There is, unfortunately, very little Kentucky case law directly construing
these constitutional provisions, and where they have been interpreted, the
various contexts have been decidedly different from the one comprising
the focus of this Note. As such, they provide only nominal guidance and
very little insight into how a Kentucky appellate court would directly apply
those provisions to the temporary criminal immunity argument. Still, it is
at least instructive to look at what the Supreme Court of Kentucky has said
when explicitly referencing these sections of Kentucky's Constitution.
The watershed case with respect to sections 27 and 28 is undoubtedly
Legislative Research Commission v. Brown."' In Brown the Kentucky General
Assembly had voted to confer unprecedented power on Kentucky's
Legislative Research Commission ("LRC"). 88 The Governor and Attorney
General challenged the action of the General Assembly under sections
27, 28, 69, and 81, alleging (among other arguments) that the power
84 Id.
85 Ky. CONST. § 69; U. S. CONST. art. II, § i, cl. i.
86 Ky. CONST. § 81; U. S. CONST. art. 1I, § i, cl. 7.
87 Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 91 1-914 (Ky. 1984).
88 The various powers conferred upon the LRC, and challenged under the Separation of
Powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution, included: "the power of the LRC to act in
the stead of the General Assembly while it is adjourned;.., to determine or to approve budget
reductions when the General Assembly is adjourned; ... to approve the action of the executive
in applying for so-called Federal 'Block Grants;'... to grant or withhold legal effect from any
executive order promulgated by the Governor which reorganizes the administrative structure
of the executive branch of government;... and ... to delay the legal effect of administrative
regulations adopted by the Governor." Id. at 91o.
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conferred on the LRC usurped the Governor's power by infringing upon
his constitutional authority.8 9
The court proceeded to discuss the background of sections 27 and 28,
noting that the primary motivation for their adoption was a "desire to curb
the power of the General Assembly."' Above all, it was clear to the court
that the fundamental purpose of those sections was to prevent any branch
from usurping power that belongs exclusively to the other branches. Each
branch of the state government is granted power within its own sphere, and
has all the power allotted to its sphere, but may never branch into and usurp
the power of either of its coequal branches. 91 Given this interpretation,
however, it seems clear that the purpose of those sections is ultimately not
to prevent the power of one branch from negatively affecting the power
of another branch, but rather simply to prevent a coequal branch from
exercising the power allotted to another branch. Thus, these provisions
alone do not address the issue of temporary criminal immunity, where it
is clear that the chief rationale operating in its favor is not that the judicial
branch is exercising a strictly executive function, but rather that the
judicial branch is infringing on the executive's ability to properly perform
its allotted duties.
However, the Brown court went on to conclude that a statute (essentially)
declaring that "if the LRC or its subcommittee cannot constitutionally veto
proposed regulations, then the executive department cannot issue any
more regulations" was unconstitutional under sections 69 and 81.92 The
constitutional fault of this provision resulted from the fact that it "restricted
the power of the Governor to carry out his duties."93 As such, the court
made clear that sections 69 and 81 precluded any action by another branch
that, even though it did not usurp the powers of the executive branch,
nonetheless "limits and interferes with the governor's mandated duties."9
Clearly, this latter conclusion does appear to open the door to the
argument that allowing the judicial branch to prosecute a sitting Kentucky
governor would unduly "limit[] and interfere[] with the governor's
mandated duties" in violation of sections 69 and 81, by virtue of the time
commitments attendant to such a prosecution. Infringement upon, rather
than usurpation of, the duties of another branch is precisely what these
sections seek to prevent. At the same time, it is also clear that the issues
89 Id. at 91o. As the provisions delegating various functions to the LRC differed signifi-
cantly from each other, some of the arguments concentrated upon whether or not the func-
tions delegated to the LRC infringed not on the Executive branch, but rather on the power
of the General Assembly. Id.
90 Id. at 912.
91 Id. at 912-914.
92 Id. at 919.
93 Id. at 920.
94 Id.
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addressed by the court in Brown differ in significant ways from the issue
of whether or not a sitting governor can be forced to endure a criminal
trial. 95 Given the paucity of case law construing these provisions generally,
let alone in the specific context of the prosecution of a sitting governor, it
is nearly impossible to ascertain for certain how a Kentucky appellate court
would respond to such an argument. But that absence of jurisprudence, in
and of itself, leaves a somewhat plausible open door.
The importance of understanding these provisions lies in the fact that,
with respect to cases addressing immunity for executive officials, such
as those relied upon by the court in the Fletcher case, the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers inevitably lies at the heart of the debate. Both at the
federal level (where the Separation of Powers is never explicitly stated in the
Constitution, but where its implication via the structure of the government
has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court) and at the
state level, the doctrine permeates the arguments in favor of both civil and
criminal immunity, typically as a means to prevent the judicial branch from
infringing upon the duties performed by officers of the other branches (and
sometimes even its own branch). Indeed, practical considerations aside,
the Separation of Powers is the foundation upon which immunity is built.
As the following discussion of immunity case law illustrates, however,
the arguments made by Governor Fletcher and well received by the trial
court do not have the support of the vast weight of both state and federal
immunity authority. The Separation of Powers simply does not appear to
afford the kind of protection that has been bestowed upon the Governor
of Kentucky, and the immunity decision chiefly relied upon by the court
simply confirms that.
B. Presidential Immunity from Civil Suit
One of the primary bases upon which the trial court granted temporary
criminal immunity to Governor Fletcher appears to have been the United
95 Chief among the differences is the fact that Brown involved an intrusion by Kentucky's
legislature, which it was made clear in the opinion was the chief motivation behind the adop-
tion of the Separation of Powers provisions. Furthermore, the statute in Brown infringed on a
specific, concrete executive power; the argument with respect to the prosecution of a sitting
Governor is less fungible, in that it essentially relies on a vague conclusion that prosecuting
a Governor infringes on his or her ability to perform required executive duties in a general
sense. Finally, and as is demonstrated throughout the following sections, Governor Fletcher
was not arguing simply that a statute was invalid; rather, his argument was that the operation of
the criminal law itself should be stayed in order for him to perform his general duties. Such an
argument is surely bolder than the mere proposition that a statute is unconstitutional, in that it
ironically raises the question of whether or not the immunity sought infringes on the ability of
the judicial branch to perform its constitutional duties. As such, to the extent that the Court's
interpretation in Brown provides any sort of open window, its vast factual discrepancy from the
situation faced by the Fletcher administration indicates that it is open only a crack.
2oo7-2oo8]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
States Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.96 As a basic analysis
of the case illustrates, any reliance on Fitzgerald is seriously misplaced.
In Fitzgerald, President Richard Nixon was sued by a former Air
Force employee who alleged that Nixon's actions during the tenure of his
Presidency had improperly cost him his employment. 97 Relying on the
doctrine of presidential immunity, Nixon argued that the complaint against
him should be dismissed, but was denied by the district court. 9 Nixon
appealed the immunity decision, lost in the D.C. Circuit, and appealed to
the Supreme Court.99
Reversing the lower court, the Fitzgerald majority held that sitting and
former Presidents of the United States are "entitled to absolute immunity
from damages liability predicated on [their] official acts."'1 Above all,
the Court based its grant of sweeping civil immunity upon the general
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and the President's "unique position
in the constitutional scheme."1"1  Specifically, the Court noted that the
potential for facing civil litigation or liability any time a decision negatively
affected an American citizen might "distract a President from his public
duties" or otherwise render the President "unduly cautious."10 As such,
96 Hassert, supra note 35 (where the trial court cites Nixon t. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
754 (1982), and notes that the immunity granted to Fletcher was required by Nixon, wherein
the majority declared that a court "must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to
be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
branch").
97 The respondent's complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia alleged that President Nixon had participated in a "continuing conspiracy" to re-
move him from his employment with the Air Force and to deny him any other government
employment. The complaint relied chiefly on a press conference in which the President
claimed that he was "totally aware" that Fitzgerald had been fired and had approved the dis-
missal. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 739-741 (1982). Nixon retracted these comments
the following day, upon claims that he had believed the questioner was referring to another
executive branch employee. Id. at 737.
98 Id. at 740-741.
99 Id. at 74I.
ioo Id. at 749 (noting that such immunity is "a functionally mandated incident of the
President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the Separation of Powers
and supported by our history"). However, the "absolute" nature of the immunity granted was
tempered somewhat by the Court's determination that the "official acts" immunity protection
extended only to "acts within the 'outer perimeter' of [the President's] official responsibility."
Id. at 756.
io Id. at 749. The majority noted that the President, as chief of the nation's Executive
Branch, was "entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and
sensitivity." Id. at 75 o . Notably for purposes of this Note, the Court rejected the argument
that Presidents are entitled only to qualified immunity under federal law in the same man-
ner as state chief executives sued in Federal § 1983 actions (discussed infra), because "[tihe
President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive of-
ficials." Id. at 750.
102 Id. at 753.
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the Court argued, allowing civil suits against the President even after he
or she leaves office would likely have such a negative impact upon the
Chief Executive's performance as to "raise unique risks to the effective
functioning of government." 103
Though the trial court in Commonwealth v. Fletcher relied on Fitzgerald
as providing a balancing test that militated in favor of temporary immunity
from prosecution, the Fitzgeraldmajority's rationale indicates that, in the face
of a criminal indictment of the President of the United States, the outcome
would have been decidedly different. The core rationale of Fitzgerald, being
a fear that the President's necessary exercise of discretion in the national
interest would be unduly tempered, cannot logically provide a rationale for
the grant of immunity provided by the Fletcher trial court. To make such a
contention would be to argue that the Governor must not be deterred from
taking criminal actions in the interest of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
unquestionably an irrational basis. 104 Moreover, given the temporary nature
of the immunity granted, unless the Governor of Kentucky places no value
on future freedom from criminal prosecution, the deterrence rationale is
not served by the degree of immunity provided Governor Fletcher. The
purpose of temporary criminal immunity was to prevent a "time intrusion"
on the sitting Governor,10 a principle obviously absent from the Fitzgerald
Court's grant of absolute civil immunity.
The Fitzgerald Court even hints, though only obliquely, at the
notion that courts should not withhold the exercise of jurisdiction over a
President of the United States in a criminal context. The Court noted
that the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the balancing that must be
considered before any exercise of jurisdiction over the President was just
that: a balancing act. Not every exercise of jurisdiction over the President
is barred by his or her constitutional status."° "When judicial action is
needed to serve broad public interests" such as "in an ongoing criminal
prosecution," then the status of the Presidency must give way.'07 Simply
103 Id. at 75 .
1o4 The Fitzgerald majority does note that the President's charge to manage the Executive
Branch requires the flexibility "to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most
important duties." Id. at 750. Certainly, the Governor of Kentucky is charged with a similar
task as head of its Executive Branch. But where the official action of managing the person-
nel of the Executive Branch is conducted in such a manner as to violate deliberately enacted
criminal statutes, to allow immunity from prosecution for the Governor on grounds of a fear
that he or she will be deterred in the exercise of those duties arguably renders the merit hiring
statute entirely inapplicable as to the Governor. Given that the Governor has the ultimate
power with respect to the personnel management of the Executive Branch, a grant of absolute
immunity from prosecution would effectively render the criminal statute null and void alto-
gether, and thus was a position not even contemplated in the trial court's opinion.
105 Hassert, supra note 35.
io6 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 753-54.
107 Id. at 754. However, with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction in an ongoing
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put, "there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for
example, in criminal prosecutions."'' 0
C. Clinton v. Jones and the Insignificance
of Litigation-Generated Time Infringement
On the only occasion in which the United States Supreme Court has
addressed a chief executive immunity argument based on the time intrusion
of legal process, it was soundly rejected. In Clinton v. Jones, the respondent
filed a complaint against President Bill Clinton alleging unwanted sexual
advances in violation of both federal statutes and state tort laws.109
President Clinton, relying on constitutional principles of presidential
immunity, argued that he should be granted temporary immunity from the
litigation. 0 While the district court agreed to grant temporary immunity
from a trial (though not from discovery), the court of appeals held that such
immunity was unprecedented."'
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the chief concern driving
the grant of immunity to former President Nixon in Fitzgerald, being an
effort "to avoid rendering the President 'unduly cautious in the discharge
of his official duties,"' was simply not present in Clinton's case."2 In Jones,
the litigation stemmed from the President's unofficial actions, taken before
he ascended to the Presidency."3 The President's official duties were
not being scrutinized, and presumably Clinton would not become overly
cautious in the discharge of said duties as a result of his prosecution. As
such, immunity "grounded purely in the identity of his office" was not
available.'
In what the Court acknowledged to be his "strongest argument,""'
Clinton asserted that temporary immunity from civil litigation should be
granted because the time intrusion of litigation would hamper the President
in the discharge of his executive branch duties, thus violating the Doctrine
criminal prosecution, the Court was not referring specifically to a direct prosecution of the
President, but rather to its earlier decision in UnitedStates v. Nixon, discussed infra, which held
that a President could be required to turn over evidence for a criminal investigation despite an
invocation of executive privilege. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
io8 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37.
io9 Specifically, the complaint against Clinton alleged a deprivation of constitutional
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a conspiracy to violate the respondent's federal constitu-
tional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arkansas
state law, and defamation under Arkansas law. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,685-86 (1997).
iio Id. at 684, 686.
i Id. at 687-88.
112 See id. at 693-94 (citing Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32).
113 Jones, 520 U.S. at 695.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 697.
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of Separation of Powers.1 6 Responding with a pragmatic argument, the
Court distinguished lawsuits arising from a President's numerous official
acts from those premised upon a President's unofficial actions. Unlike the
former, which would inevitably result in a deluge of litigation, the President
is so far removed from contact with individuals in American society that he
is actually far less of a target for civil litigation from his unofficial acts than
are average citizens."'
Analyzing the argument from a Separation of Powers perspective,
the Court determined that "the fact that a federal court's exercise of...
jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief
Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution."'
1 8
First, the actions of Presidents have long been held subject to judicial
review.'19 Furthermore, and as discussed in Fitzgerald, the Court noted
that the President is not and has never been automatically spared by the
Separation of Powers Doctrine from the jurisdiction of Article III courts.2 0
Given the long-held validity of submitting the President to such jurisdiction
in spite of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the Court concluded that "it
must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of
[the President's] unofficial conduct" despite the burden thereof.' Though
the Court acknowledged to some extent the burden and distraction of
civil litigation that might in some respect impair the President in the
pursuit of his duties, it ultimately downplayed the significance of such
time intrusions and concluded that "such distractions ... do not ordinarily
implicate constitutional Separation of Powers concerns."' 2 As such, there
was no requirement under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers to provide
the President with temporary immunity from civil process for his unofficial
conduct."3
i16 Id. at 701-02.
1 17 See id. at 702 n.36.
i 18 Id. at 703.
1 19 Id. As an example, the Court pointed to its holding in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer that President Truman had "exceeded his constitutional authority." Id. (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
120 Id. at 705 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982)). In particular, the
Court noted the fact that President Nixon had been subjected to the process of the courts,
pursuant to a criminal investigation of other members of the executive branch, by a subpoena
request with which he was compelled to comply. Id. at 704 (citing United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (I974));seealso discussion infra notes 141-156 and accompanying text (discussing
Nixon).
121 Jones, 520 U.S. at 705. In fact, the Court noted that the burden upon the President's
time from defending his official actions when subjected to judicial review in Article III courts,
and the burden of occasionally having such acts invalidated was surely more "onerous" than
the burden of defending against tort liability in civil actions. Id.
122 Id. at 706.
123 Id. at 705-06.
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Given the lack of credence the Supreme Court lends to the time
intrusion argument in Jones, it appears that there is little validity in basing
temporary immunity from prosecution for Kentucky's Chief Executive
upon an analogy to presidential immunity. Indeed, operating under the
assumption that the time intrusion of a criminal prosecution would be little
if any more onerous than the defense of a civil litigation, Jones provides
no support for an argument that the burden of such a time intrusion must
be respected through temporary executive immunity. When this already
weakened argument is shifted to the criminal context, in which the Fitzgerald
case makes clear that the public interest in the prompt operation of the
legal process is greater, and where it is clear that there is no public need to
prohibit interference with the decision-making process of the executive
(in that "criminal conduct is not part of the necessary functions performed
by public officials")" 4 an argument for temporary criminal immunity on the
basis of the presidential immunity analogy becomes untenable." 5
D. Civil Immunity for State Chief Executives Under FederalLaw
Prior Supreme Court precedent with respect to immunity from civil suit in
other contexts likewise indicates that the President occupies a completely
unique position in the American constitutional scheme, one that the
governor of any state would find extreme difficulty in analogizing to.
Indeed, the treatment of state executive officials, including governors, has
been notably less favorable with respect to immunity than that afforded to
the President.
In Scheurer v. Rhodes, the Governor of Ohio was sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for his part as chief of the Ohio National Guard in the deaths of three
students killed during a protest at Kent State University in May of 1970.126
After the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint against the Governor
124 United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.d 1124, 1144 (7 th Cir. 1973).
125 Though it is true that the charges against Governor Fletcher were for his misconduct
in taking official action, as opposed to the unofficial actions taken by the President in Jones,
it is clear that this difference is of no consequence in light of the fact that the immunity
provided to Fletcher was only temporary in nature, with the basic rationale resting almost ex-
clusively on the time intrusion argument. Absent the fear of unduly tempering the governor's
decision-making process, see discussion supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text, the clear
public importance in proceeding promptly with criminal prosecutions, and the Jones Court's
clear disregard for the time intrusion that legal process places upon a chief executive, the
fact that the Governor's actions were official provides no hook to a theory of immunity under
Fitzgerald. The criminal nature of the allegations would seem to make his claim for temporary
immunity even weaker given the language of Jones.
126 Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 233-34 (1974). The petitioner also brought an
Ohio state law claim against the Governor. Id. at 234.
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on grounds of "absolute 'executive immunity"' from suit for his official
acts, the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court."7
The Court justified the long history of civil immunity for public officials
as an implied consequence of a hopeless contradiction: they have a duty to
govern, but at the same time they are human and naturally "may err."' To
wit, "the concept of immunity assumes [the likelihood of error] and goes on
to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such
error than [for the public official] not to decide or act at all."''2 9
For the Court, this reality alone did not justify providing government
officials other than the President with the kind of absolute immunity
granted in Fitzgerald. With no "unique position in the constitutional
scheme"' 130 upon which to rely, the Court observed that governors and
other state executive officials are entitled merely to "qualified immunity"
in a § 1983 action.1 3 1 Though state officials are often placed in difficult
circumstances with respect to decision-making, it is those circumstances
and the concomitant duties that arise that should define the scope of an
official's immunity, not his or her title. 32 As such, this "qualified immunity"
is only available where it is determined that there were "reasonable
grounds" for the decision rendered in light of "all the circumstances"
and where there was a "good-faith belief" that the decision made was an
appropriate one.133
The Court proceeded in other contexts to further refine the concept
of "qualified immunity" as an alternative to the more sweeping "absolute
immunity" afforded to the President. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, a case
springing from the same fact pattern that provided the basis for the Court's
decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court cited approvingly to Scheurera34 in
127 Id. at 238.
128 Id. at 241-42.
129 Id. at 242.
13o Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
131 Scheurer, 4 i6 U.S. at 247. This was also in part a consequence of the Court's observation
that to allow state officials absolute immunity from private suits would essentially defeat the
purpose behind the creation of §1983, that being to prevent deprivations of constitutional
rights, and to remedy such deprivations in the event that they should occur. See id. at 243. If
absolute immunity were the rule, "§ 1983 would be drained of meaning." Id. at 248.
132 Id. at 247.
133 Id. at 247-48.
134 Also on the authority of Scheurer, only qualified immunity had been afforded to
"high federal officials" who had claimed absolute immunity in a case decided prior to Harlow.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 807 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
Essentially, as in Scheurer, the Court found that qualified immunity provided a better balancing
of the dual needs of preventing discouragement of executive officials in the discharge of their
duties and the need to provide citizens with some form of redress (via § 1983 actions) against
government officials acting in a manner that deprives private citizens of their constitutional
rights. Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (978)). The same is true of presidential
cabinet officials. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
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determining that aides to President Nixon who were sued by Fitzgerald
under § 1983 were not absolutely immune from civil suit despite the
proximity of their positions to the decision-making processes of the Oval
Office. 135 State court judges facing § 1983 claims on the basis of their official
acts (when in an administrative role) receive a similar form of qualified
immunity.
13 6
Though the aforementioned line of cases are not directly applicable
to the temporary criminal immunity granted in Fletcher (in that they deal
with civil immunity in the federal context), they do demonstrate the less
favorable treatment accorded by federal courts to state chief executives
(and all officials other than the President of the United States) when faced
with a claim of immunity. A governor simply does not occupy a position
in the constitutional scheme that would entitle him or her to the level
of immunity granted to the President of the United States-even in the
context of mere civil litigation. An analogy, in the criminal context, to
the immunity afforded to the President of the United States, such as the
analogy supplied by the trial court in Fletcher, while misplaced from the
outset, appears all the less reliable in light of the Scheurer line of cases.
E. Civil Immunity for the State Chief Executive under Kentucky Law
It appears that with respect to immunity, even where Kentucky law
applies, the Governor does not occupy a position in the state constitutional
scheme that parallels the one occupied by the President in the federal
constitutional scheme. Kentucky's highest court has made clear that in the
area of immunity, decisions of the United States Supreme Court are merely
entitled to "great respect." As the following discussion demonstrates, it
appears that where a suit is brought against a state official under color of
state law, or where a state official is indicted for criminal conduct under
state criminal law, it is ultimately up to the Kentucky courts to determine
the degree of immunity that attaches.'37
U.S. 511 (1985)).
135 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813. The Court did not foreclose the possibility that, on remand,
the petitioners might be able to demonstrate that the public policy concerns with which they
were charged would demand absolute immunity. In order to obtain absolute immunity, the
petitioners would be required to demonstrate "that the responsibilities of [their] office em-
braced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability" and that they were
"discharging the protected function when performing the act for which liability is asserted."
Id. at 812-13. However, the Court was far more comfortable affording the presidential aides
qualified immunity on the basis of prior precedent and by virtue of the doctrine's status as
"the best attainable accommodation of competing values." Id. at 814.
136 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230.
137 Thompson v. Huecker, 559 S.W.2d 488, 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973)). Indeed, immunity in the state of Kentucky is a rapidly
evolving area that has endured significant changes in recent years. See generally G. Thomas
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At this stage in Kentucky's immunity jurisprudence, it is not entirely
clear what level of immunity the Governor is entitled to when faced with
a civil suit. It is clear that the Governor is absolutely immune when he is
sued in his official capacity, as a derivation of the constitutional doctrine
of sovereign immunity.138 When the Governor is sued in his individual
capacity, it appears that only qualified immunity applies. 13 9 Despite this,
there is some hint in the aforementioned Footnote 16 of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky's decision in Baker v. Fletcher that the Governor would
be entitled to absolute immunity under the law in the same manner that the
President is entitled to absolute immunity under the rule of Fitzgerald.'"
Barker, Official Immunity in Kentucky: The New Standard Under Yanero v. Davis, 90 Ky. L.J. 635
(2001-2002).
138 Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Ky. zoo) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (ig99)); Tate v. Salmon, 79 Ky. L. Rptr. 540 (88I); Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. 439 (1828);
Watkins-El v. Fletcher, No. 2oo5 -CA-ooo279-MR, zoo6 WL 1514296 (Ky. Ct. App. June 2,
2oo6); 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories and Dependencies § 104 (1974). This immunity only ap-
plies "when the state is the real party against which the relief is sought." Yanero, 65 S.W.3d
at 518 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)); Tate v. Salmon, 79 Ky. L. Rptr. 540 (1881);
Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. 439 (18z8); 72 AM .JJR. 2D States, Territories and Dependencies § o4
(1 974).
139 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522. Qualified immunity operates to protect public officials in
the event that they negligently perform "(i) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involv-
ing the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision and judgment
... (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the [officer's or] employee's authority." Id.
The decision overruled Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.zd 195 (1997), a prior Kentucky
case that had held that "a public officer or employee is always immune from tort liability for
negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct." Id. at 523. The Yanero standard was apparently ap-
plied in Watkins-Elv. Fletcher, where a sentenced criminal filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court
against Governor Fletcher, in both the latter's individual and official capacities, on grounds
that Fletcher failed to fulfill his constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" by failing to commute Watkins-El's life sentence. Watkins-El, zoo6 WL 1514296,
at i. The Court of Appeals determined that Fletcher was immune from civil suit in his indi-
vidual capacity because the decision as to whether or not to commute a sentence is assigned
to the sole discretion of the Governor under section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution. Id.
However, the Court never actually describes the immunity granted as "qualified," and it failed
to address the other elements of qualified immunity that were elucidated in Yanero.
140 In discussing legislative immunity, the majority opinion in Baker notes only that it "is
not materially different from acknowledged judicial and executive immunities, which, stated
simply, stand for the proposition that a judge or chief executive enjoys absolute immunity
for actions taken in their official capacities while in office," leaving the initial impression that
"chief executive" applies to not only the President, but also governors. Baker v. Fletcher,
204 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Ky. 2oo6). For this proposition, the majority cites to Justice Cooper's
opinion in Yanero, and notes (correctly) that it cites approvingly (or at least affirmatively) to
Fitzgerald. Id. at 595. However, in Yanero the majority speaks of absolute immunity only in
the context of judges, legislators and prosecutors, Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 518, and then discusses
the absolute immunity of the President, pursuant to Fitzgerald, which the Court notes is avail-
able "primarily because of the uniqueness of his office and the constitutional tradition of
Separation of Powers." Id. The opinion says nothing of absolute immunity in the context of
state chief executives. As such, if the opinion in Baker was (in dictum) attempting to imply
that a Kentucky governor is entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit on par with that
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As such, it is not one hundred percent clear whether or not the Governor of
Kentucky does in fact enjoy absolute immunity from suit.
With so little jurisprudence in Kentucky regarding the level of
immunity afforded to Kentucky's Governor even in the civil context, there
is little upon which to ascertain how the Kentucky Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals would rule in the area of temporary immunity from criminal
prosecution. Still, assuming the Baker dictum to be a questionable outlier,
a review of the relevant case law with respect to civil immunity indicates
that Kentucky courts do not afford the Governor treatment on par with
that afforded to the President of the United States any more so than do
the federal courts, despite possessing the clear authority to do so (when
applying Kentucky law). As such, state immunity law does not appear to
nrovide any lovical foundation upon which the district court in the Fletcher
case could have been relying, particularly given that it was decided in the
criminal context. This likely explains why the Franklin District Court
relied chiefly (albeit incorrectly) on federal immunity case law.
F Civil Immunity, Even Where Absolute,
Does Not Translate to Criminal Immunity
Despite his unparalleled position in the constitutional scheme, even the
President of the United States is not impervious to judicial process. In
United States v. Nixon, President Nixon was ordered, via a subpoena duces
tecum, "to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to
his conversations with aides and advisors" as evidence in a criminal
prosecution in federal district court.M4 Nixon refused to turn over the tapes
or documents and, relying on the doctrine of Executive Privilege, sought a
motion to quash the subpoena that was refused in trial court.
14
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
Executive Privilege does not render the President unqualifiedly immune
from criminal process. Rather, the privilege is qualified, and must be
balanced against the legitimate needs of the judicial branch to administer
criminal justice and afford due process to criminal defendants in need of
such evidence. 43 Though the Court never explicitly declares that the
enjoyed by the President of the United States, it is not at all clear that there is any basis in
Kentucky law for such an assertion.
141 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,686 (1974).
142 Id.
143 In particular, the Court noted that where the claim of privilege was grounded only on
a "generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of
due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." Id. at 713. Indeed, the Court
noted that the privilege argument would have been more likely to prevail in the face of "a
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets." Id. at 706.
In the absence of such a need for privilege, a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
the production of all evidence against her prevails. Id. at 711.
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President could not be afforded temporary immunity from prosecution (as
the issue was not before the Court), the majority opinion does make clear
that even the President, despite his unique stature in the constitutional
scheme, is not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts in a criminal
context. 
4
In general, and in addition to the President of the United States, when
acting within their judicial role, judges at the state and federal level are
granted absolute immunity from civil suit, 145 even in the face of § 1983
actions."4 As with absolute presidential immunity from civil suit, the
purpose is to ensure that judges are not deterred in the exercise of their
judicial function. Mirroring the President's need to make oft-controversial
decisions, the absolute nature of the immunity granted is a function
of the judge's need to decide cases "that arouse . . .intense feelings in
litigants."''
Nonetheless, despite the absolute nature of the civil immunity afforded
to state judges, it is also clear that "the judicially fashioned doctrine of
official immunity does not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal conduct
proscribed by an Act of Congress . ... 11141 In O'Shea v. Littleton, the Court
made clear that the immunization of criminal conduct is never necessary
144 This has been the interpretation attributed to Nixon by the Court in subsequent
cases. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54; (1982); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 68i, 704-05.
(1997).
145 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,553-54 (1967) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 8o U.S. (3 Wall.)
335 (187)) (noting that "few doctrines [are] more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdic-
tion"). This is distinct from the situation in which a judge is acting in an administrative role,
such as in the process of hiring and firing employees of the courts over which they preside,
in which judges receive only qualified immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988)
(holding that judges only possess absolute immunity in respect to their judicial acts).
146 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55.
147 Id. at 554-
148 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (citing Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 6o6, 627 (1972)). The case involved an injunction suit against a state trial court judge, in
which the respondents alleged that the judge had conducted the administration of justice in
the court in a manner that established a pattern of discrimination against African-American
citizens of Alexander County, Ill., and sought to have such practices enjoined. Id. at 49i. The
Court found that the injury, alleged to result by its failure to provide an injunction, would
be "conjectural," and that the likelihood of irreparable injury absent an injunction was not
established by the respondents, such that there was no establishment of an Article III "case or
controversy." Id. at 502-04. However, the Court noted that a damages action might provide
relief to the respondents despite the presence of absolute immunity for civil judges, because
judges "who would willfully discriminate on the ground of race or otherwise would willfully
deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights.., must take account of 18 U.S.C. § 242," which
establishes such conduct as a criminal deprivation of constitutional rights, punishable under
federal criminal law. Id. at 503. Thus, given the lack of criminal immunity available to all
"judicial, legislative or executive officers," Id. (emphasis added), the plaintiffs would not be
deprived of a cause of action for damages at law.
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for "the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive
officers."149
Though Littleton does not address the question of whether or not
temporary immunity from prosecution would be appropriate for a "judicial,
legislative, or executive" officer,' a subsequent Supreme Court case
suggests strongly that time considerations would not suffice to stay a federal
criminal prosecution against a state court judge. In Dennis v. Sparks, a state
court judge was sued in a § 1983 action on grounds that he had corruptly
issued an injunction as a result of a conspiracy with two of the respondent's
co-defendants, depriving them of profit on various mineral leases.", The
Court granted the judge absolute immunity on the authority of Pierson v.
Ray, thus barring the suit against the judge; however, as the respondent's
co-defendants in the lower court suit had no such claim to immunity, the
litigation against them was allowed to proceed.' The co-defendants
argued for immunity on grounds that a failure to grant them immunity
would unduly interfere with the judge's absolute immunity, because the
judge would be required to testify and otherwise be "heavily involved"
in the suit against his co-conspirators."' The Court acknowledged that
"testifying takes time and energy that otherwise might be devoted to
judicial duties," but noted that "judicial immunity was not designed to
insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability."'' - 4 On the
authority of Littleton and Nixon, and despite the time infringement that
would befall the judge were he forced to participate in the litigation, the
Court found that the co-defendants were required to defend against the
suit.
s5
Though the issue of whether or not the President is immune from
criminal prosecution (even temporarily) has never been addressed, and
though the same has never been addressed with respect to a state governor
facing federal criminal charges, the above survey of existing Supreme Court
149 Id.
150 Id. at 504. State court judges in Kentucky are elected officials, with definite terms,
and thus it is plausible that a judge could invoke temporary immunity from prosecution in
the same manner that Governor Fletcher did, founded on the same "time infringement" ra-
tionale.
151 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1980).
152 Id. at 27-29 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)).
153 Id. at30.
154 Id. at 30-31.
155 Id. at 30-32. The Court also acknowledged the argument that allowing the suit to
go forward against the judge's co-conspirators would inevitably lead to a public analysis of
the judge's actions. Still, despite these concerns (in addition to the aforementioned time
infringement concerns), the Court found that "the potential harm to the public from deny-
ing immunity to private co-conspirators is outweighed by the benefits of providing a remedy
against those private persons who participate in subverting the judicial process and in so doing
inflict injury on other persons." Id.
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precedent indicates that a state governor would not receive temporary
immunity from prosecution if he or she were to face federal criminal
charges. Even the singularly regarded President of the United States is
not immune from the process of the courts in the context of a criminal
prosecution, pursuant to Nixon. Given the kinder treatment afforded to
the President relative to state governors with respect to immunity at the
federal level, it is clear that the Governor of Kentucky would be regarded
no differently.
Furthermore, the Court's language with respect to the treatment of
state judges subject to criminal charges provides demonstrable, though
not direct, additional evidence that a state governor would not be afforded
temporary immunity from prosecution on federal criminal charges. Given
the Dennis Court's propensity to hold the "time infringement" argument in
such little regard, it is all the more apparent that the Supreme Court would
find that the criminal prosecution of a state judge (being more vital to the
public interest relative to a private civil suit against other parties) would
outweigh the time infringement concerns that such a prosecution would
entail, and would be unlikely to stay the prosecution until the end of the
judge's term. Upon a review of the Court's precedent, there is no logical
reason to believe that a state chief executive would be treated any differently
in similar circumstances." 6 To wit, any reliance on federal immunity as a
justification for providing Kentucky's Governor with temporary immunity
appears completely misplaced.
VI. THE NARROW SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE CRIMINAL IMMUNITY
The federal judicial system is not entirely devoid of criminal immunity
for public officials. Where available in the federal constitutional scheme,
however, criminal immunity has been severely limited. The Speech or
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution declares that federal
legislators "for any Speech or Debate in either House .. .shall not be
questioned in any other Place."1"7 The clause, derived from the English
156 Particularly illustrative of this conclusion is the Court's statement in Littleton that
criminal immunity is categorically unavailable for "judicial, legislative, or executive officers."
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). Furthermore, it is clear that the Court does not
distinguish between officers of the judicial and executive branch on this matter because, in
the Court's determination that a state court judge could be made to testify in a civil suit de-
spite the time infringement, one of the pillars upon which it relied was its decision in Nixon,
which dealt specifically with chief executive privilege relative to the process of the criminal
courts. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 31-32 (citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974)).
157 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. The Kentucky Constitution contains a virtually identical
provision: "[Flor any speech or debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any
other place." Ky. CONST. § 43. However, the Kentucky courts have generally looked to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Article I, section 6 in determining how to apply section 43.
See Kraus v. Ky. State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433,440 (Ky. 1993); Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 S.W.2d 262,
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common law, was included in the United States Constitution "to protect
the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of
individual legislators."''5 1 To achieve that end, the Speech or Debate
Clause protects members of Congress "from inquiry into legislative acts or
the motivation for actual performance of legislative acts."'
159
The United States Supreme Court has narrowly confined the Speech or
Debate Clause to only those inquiries clearly contemplated by its text. In
United States v. Brewster, a former Senator, charged with accepting bribes to
influence his votes as a member of the Senate Committee on Post Office
and Civil Service, made a motion to dismiss the charges on the basis of the
Speech or Debate Clause, which was granted as to some of the counts of
the indictment by the District Court. 6 ° On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the district court, finding that "a Member of Congress may be
prosecuted under a criminal statute provided that the government's case
does not rely on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts."''
Members of Congress were not, by virtue of the clause, to be rendered
"super-citizens" 6 beyond the reach of the criminal law. Thus, held the
Court, the act of accepting a bribe in contravention of a congressionally
passed statute, even where the bribe was meant to influence official
legislative actions, was not an "inquiry into acts that occur in the regular
course of the legislative process [or] into the motivation for those acts.' '
The federal Constitution also protects members of Congress from arrest
"during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in
going to and returning from the same."' 164 This freedom from arrest, much
like the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause (to which it is textually
adjacent), is qualified in that a member of Congress can be arrested in
264 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (I95 I)). As such, Supreme
Court precedent will serve as the focus of the analysis of the scope of Speech or Debate
Clause immunity.
158 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). As such, the Court noted, it was
not included "simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress." Id.
159 Id. at 509 (citing United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966)). A similar inter-
pretation by the Court held that the Clause should be read to "include anything 'generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it."'
Id. (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. I68, 204 (188I)).
16o Id. at 502-04.
I61 Id. at 512.
16z Id. at 516.
163 Id. at 524-25. Ultimately, the Court found that the actions of the senator in question
were not, given the scope of the immunity as defined, protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause, because "no inquiry into legislative acts or motivation for legislative acts" was neces-
sary. Id. at 525.
164 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. The Kentucky Constitution contains a similar provision: "The
members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except treason, felony, breach or surety of
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance on the sessions of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same...." Ky. CONST. § 43.
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the case of "Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace."'65 This has been
construed by the Supreme Court to protect members of Congress only in the
case of "civil arrest," a practice no longer common in the United States, but
common at the time of its adoption.' 66 Along with "Treason" and "Felony,"
"Breach of the Peace" has been interpreted by the Court to encompass
all forms of criminal conduct, meaning that members of Congress are not
free from arrest for any criminal charges (though they may subsequently be
able to claim the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause, in the proper,
narrow context).167 Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution, in reliance on
federal law, has been construed in an identical manner.6a
A review of the criminal immunity expressly available in both the state
and federal context makes two principles abundantly clear. First, where
such immunity has been granted, it has been explicitly granted by the text
of either the state or federal constitution, as the case may be. Second, such
immunity is, in the overall realm of possible bases for criminal prosecution,
narrow in its scope. Both of these factors, in both the federal context and
the Kentucky context, militate against the existence of temporary criminal
immunity for Kentucky's governor, where such immunity does not appear in
the text of Kentucky's Constitution, and where the general scope of criminal
immunity is decidedly narrow. At the same time, legislative immunity is,
where available, absolute in nature, distinguishing it from the temporary
criminal immunity provided to Governor Fletcher. As such, the failure to
include such immunity in the text of the Kentucky Constitution, though
damaging to the argument, does not necessarily preclude its existence.
VII. THE IMMUNITY EXPERIENCE IN OTHER AMERICAN STATES
In light of the recent revelation of a potential executive criminal immunity
doctrine in Kentucky, it is worth inquiring why other governors would not
have raised a similar argument in their own states. Likely, the answer is that
such a doctrine would be found constitutionally repugnant. Though there
has been no direct discussion of the topic, a survey of available case law
and actual circumstances from other states reveals that the establishment
of a doctrine of chief executive immunity from criminal prosecution would
165 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 6.
166 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 614 (1972) (citing Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76,
83 (1934)); Brewster, 408 U.S. at 520-2 1.
167 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 614 (citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425,446 (I9O8));
Brewster 408 U.S. at 520-21 (citing Williamson, 207 U.S. 425). Indeed, the Court in Brewster, re-
futing the petitioner's argument for a broader interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause,
noted that to provide a broader interpretation would be "inconsistent" with the reading the
Court had given to the freedom from arrest privilege. Id.
168 See Swope v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Ky. 1964).
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bring Kentucky out of line with virtually all American jurisdictions that
have faced the situation of an indicted governor.' 69
A. State Legal Doctrine
Unfortunately, to the extent that courts have ruminated on the subject of
executive criminal immunity, they have never specifically addressed the
possibility of merely temporary immunity from prosecution. However, one
court has at least by implication rejected such a notion.
In an early twentieth-century case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
made clear that the Governor of Pennsylvania was not immune "from
arrest, prosecution and punishment if he violates [Pennsylvania's] criminal
statutes." 170 In In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, the District
Attorney of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, petitioned a local court to open
a grand jury investigation of the Governor's allegedly criminal campaign
activities. At that point, there had been no investigation of the informal
charges against the Governor, and no formal allegation had been levied
against him in the petition for the grand jury investigation. 7'
The Governor and Attorney General of Pennsylvania responded by
petitioning the Supreme Court to intercede and prevent the convening
of a grand jury. Primary among their various arguments was that the
investigation, absent any formal charges, would "interfere with and hamper
the executive branch in its conduct of government" and "enable the Grand
Jury to pass upon not merely criminal violations, but the efficiency and
regularity of the management of the entire executive department."'7 The
court responded by noting that it did not understand the Governor to be
arguing that he was immune from prosecution, and made clear that were
it to provide him with wholesale immunity from prosecution during his
tenure in office, it "would be possible for a corrupt [governor] to bankrupt
the State, and, when apprehended for trial, plead immunity."' 7 3 Rather,
they understood the Governor's argument to be that the opening of a grand
jury investigation where no specific crimes had been alleged, simply for
169 For purposes of this Note, given the aforementioned discussion of federal charges
against sitting governors and the refusal of federal courts to provide immunity of the kind
awarded to Governor Fletcher, the experience from other states is only helpful insofar as the
charges levied against a sitting governor are promulgated under state law and tried in state
courts who have the opportunity to pass upon the temporary immunity issue with respect to
their state constitutions. The absence of any discussion of the matter by a state court trying
a sitting governor on state charges provides a strong indication that the argument either was
never made, or, more importantly, was patently disregarded by the courts as without consti-
tutional foundation.
170 In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 2 A.zd 783, 787 (Pa. 1938).
171 Id. at 786.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 787-88.
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purposes of determining whether or not crimes may have been committed,
"would seriously obstruct the operation of the executive branch of the
government;" the court agreed with the argument so framed.,74 In drawing
this conclusion, the court carefully distinguished between the situation
facing them in the instant case and the situation where "the grand jury
[knows] what crimes it is to investigate," noting that "[an investigation
which properly concerns itself with violations of the criminal laws in matters
incidental to the conduct of government, and does not merely inquire into
the official acts of the governing power... is within the power of the grand
jury." 175
While the court in Dauphin County did not directly address the
possibility of temporary immunity from a criminal trial, they made clear
that charges properly levied against a governor would permit an indictment
and a concomitant investigation by the grand jury. The court's language
mirrored the very concerns voiced by the Fletcher administration in
regards to the proceedings of a criminal prosecution: "[Jlury investigations
involve great expense to the public, subject the citizen to inconvenience,
and frequently interfere with the normal functioning of public officials..
176 Yet, even in the face of these concerns, the court's decision makes
clear that a governor's time constraints are not sufficient reason to bring
the criminal justice system to a halt. Time only becomes a concern where
the investigation is merely exploratory in nature. Coupled with the court's
clear contempt and disregard for the mere concept of criminal immunity
based purely on political office, it does not appear that Governor Fletcher's
arguments would be so well received in Pennsylvania.
17
Courts that in any way directly address whether or not the Governor
could be absolutely immune from prosecution have quickly and succinctly
dismissed such arguments.1 78 Though this does not explicitly demonstrate
174 Id. at 788.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 789 (quoting In re McNair, 187 A. 498, 505 (Pa. 1936)).
177 To be fair, the court in Fletcher made clear that charges were permitted to be brought
against a sitting governor, but not "pursued." Hassert, supra note 35. However, it is not clear
precisely what is meant by "pursued," and it is important to point out that, at that point, it
would have been difficult for the court to conclude that a grand jury investigation and subse-
quent indictment would be improper purely on "time infringement" grounds, seeing as the
investigation and indictment had already come to fruition. Thus, barring the prosecution was
the only option practically available to the trial court.
Also in fairness, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was not faced with the question of
whether or not the Governor could be prosecuted upon charges properly brought. However,
the court's rhetoric indicates strongly that the argument that mere time inconveniences could
stay the prosecution of a sitting governor would not have been well received.
178 None of the courts declaring that governors are not immune from prosecution were
faced directly with that contention; rather, it was typically an argument in the alternative or a
side issue in the case. Nonetheless, all of the courts reached the same conclusion. See United
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that these courts would be unwilling to entertain a temporary immunity
argument, the absence of even the slightest mention of such immunity may
indicate that it is out of the realm of possibility, and at the very least puts
the contention made by Chief Justice Lambert in Footnote 16 of Baker in
serious doubt when compared with the jurisprudence of other states.
B. Prosecutions of Governors in State Courts on State Charges
Perhaps more illustrative of the weakness of the argument for temporary
immunity from criminal prosecution are the various instances in which
state governors have been tried in state courts on state criminal charges
during their tenure in office. In all, there have not been a great number of
indictments of sitting American governors, and many of these have been in
federal courts on federal rather than state charges.'79 Most notable about
these prosecutions is the total absence of a temporary immunity argument.
Certainly, if such immunity were available in any form, one would expect a
governor facing criminal charges to invoke it.
In Mecham v. Gordon, the Governor of Arizona had been indicted
on charges of perjury, willful concealment, and filing a false campaign
contributions report.180 Before the Supreme Court of Arizona, the Governor
made an argument similar to that made by the Fletcher administration, only
in reverse. Governor Mecham contended that he could not be subjected
to impeachment proceedings until after the conclusion of his criminal trial.
In essence, because he could not attend a criminal trial and impeachment
proceedings simultaneously, "one forum must give way to the other" and
thus "the only fair solution is to suspend the impeachment proceedings
until the criminal trial is done." '' As such, it was clear that the Governor
States v. Mandel, 415 E Supp. 1025, 1032-33 (D. Md. 1976) (holding that a governor could not
invoke legislative immunity from prosecution even when performing admittedly legislative
acts in his official capacity); Clouse v. Arizona, 16 P.3d 757, 773 (Ariz. 2001) (governor not im-
mune if she "runs a red light"); Rathbun v. Baumel, 191 N.W. 297, 305 (Iowa 1922) (Weaver,
J., dissenting on other grounds) ("The Governor is, of course, not immune against criminal
prosecution... if the facts justify it .... ).
179 As of 1997, only eleven sitting American governors had ever been indicted. William
Booth, Arizona Governor Convicted; Will Quit Friday, CHICAGO SUN-TDMES, Sept. 4, 1997, at 21.
Since that time, only two other sitting governors have been indicted. Dan Balz, Ohio's Gov.
Taft Faces 4 Misdemeanor Charges: Indictment Cites Unreported Gifts, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 18,
2005, at Ao4, and Governor Fletcher.
18o Mecham v. Gordon, 751 P.2d 957, 959 (Ariz. 1988). One distinguishing factor is that
it is not clear whether or not any of these charges stemmed from the governor's official actions.
The factual background was not made available by the court. Nonetheless, given that the
primary argument in favor of staying a prosecution is the infringement upon the governor's
time, the official or unofficial nature of the crime would seem an ancillary and arguably irrel-
evant matter. Thus, the court's actions and the progression of the prosecution are certainly
instructive.
181 Id.
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of Arizona had completely resigned himself to a criminal prosecution,
and when faced with the impeachment/prosecution dilemma during his
tenure in office, realized full well that his only viable argument was that the
impeachment proceedings should give way (though the court ultimately
disagreed with the latter contention as well).' 2
In Hunt v. Alabama, the Governor of Alabama was indicted during
his term of office on state ethics charges that alleged he had "us[ed] his
office for direct personal financial gain.1 83 Conspicuously absent from the
Governor's various arguments was any contention that prosecution could be
stayed until after his term of office was complete, indicating strongly that
the Alabama courts would not have entertained such an argument. During
his second term, Hunt was tried, convicted, and subsequently removed
from office.' s4
Indeed, the indictment and prosecution of a sitting governor on state
criminal charges, although rare, has spanned all decades of the American
experience. In an early twentieth-century case, Illinois Governor
Lennington Small was indicted on conspiracy and embezzlement charges
brought by the state's attorney general. In 1922, while still serving as
governor, Small was tried on those charges.'85 One of five Illinois governors
to be indicted, Small was the only to be indicted while in office during the
twentieth century.186 Once again, there was no evidence that an immunity
argument was made; and, if such an argument was posited, Small's
prosecution makes clear it was soundly rejected by the Illinois courts.
Other governors, rather than challenging the merits of the charges against
them, have simply pleaded guilty to charges, precluding any immunity
argument. One-term Oklahoma Governor David Walters pleaded guilty to
state misdemeanor ethics charges in 1993.87 In 2005, Ohio Governor Bob
Taft was indicted on state misdemeanor ethics charges, becoming the first
Ohio Governor to be indicted while in office. 8 8 Rather than contest the
charges and face a trial, Taft simply pleaded guilty to the violations, again
precluding any immunity argument.' To be sure, the fact that the charges
against both governors, though criminal, stemmed from misdemeanor state
182 Id. at 964 (denying the Governor's request for an injunction against the impeach-
ment proceedings).
183 Hunt v. Alabama, 642 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Ala. Crim. App. i993).
184 Tom Watson & Carl Weiser, Alabama Gov. Convicted, Removedfrom Office, USA TODAY,
Apr. 23, 1993, at 3A.
185 Andrew Herrmann & Dave McKinney, Five Other Governors Had Run-Ins with Law,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Apr. 18, 2oo6, at io. Ultimately, Small was acquitted, although there
were allegations of jury tampering. Id.
186 Steve Neal, Governors in the Gnip of Scandal, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at 29.
187 Okla. Governorto Quit, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAzETTE, Nov. 2, 1993, at A5.
188 Balz ,supra note 179.
189 Kevin Mayhood, Disclosure Lapses: Court Scolds Taft on Ethics; Justices Hand Governor
FormalPublic Reprimand, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 28, 2oo6, at oiD.
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ethics charges that carried a lighter sentence, probably influenced the
decision of the governors not to contest the charges. Still, if immunity had
been an option, it would have arguably behooved the governors to have
invoked it nonetheless, a decision which would have allowed for a period of
relief from the charges and additional time to prepare for contesting them.
Furthermore, and as demonstrated in the Fletcher case, the weight of
temporary immunity undoubtedly adds great leverage to striking a deal with
state prosecutors.1" Thus, these factual examples are not insignificant.
VII. THE MYTH OF TIHE TIME INFRINGEMENT
As noted throughout, none of these various legal arguments point to a
legal holding specifically prohibiting a court from granting the Governor of
Kentucky (or any state, for that matter) temporary immunity from prosecution
on state criminal charges. The legal evidence does strongly indicate that
the court in the Fletcher case simply misunderstood (or altogether ignored)
existing legal doctrine in concluding that such immunity was available. It
also strongly indicates that there is no logical support for such a doctrine.
As further probative of the latter point, at least one scholar has thrown
a simple yet seemingly irresistible wrench in the primary premise of the
Fletcher court's reasoning. The Fletcher court made clear that the reasoning
behind its decision to grant immunity, purportedly supported by United
States Supreme Court case law and the Kentucky Constitution, was that
to allow the prosecution of a sitting governor would impose such a time
infringement that it would be impossible for the Governor to perform his
constitutional duties. Scholar Eric Freedman, discussing the subject of
temporary criminal immunity in the context of the American Presidency,
dismisses this argument with a simple yet effective rebuttal.
The United States Constitution makes clear that the President is
amenable to impeachment proceedings while in office (and, logically, only
while in office, inasmuch as the only remedy available through impeachment
proceedings is removal from office). However, as Freedman points out,
the demand of impeachment proceedings on the chief executive's time is
likely as great or nearly as significant as the proceedings that encompass a
criminal trial in the courts.191 As evidence, Freedman notes that during the
Watergate scandal, President Nixon's attorneys made the argument that
"[tihe disruption caused by indictment and trial of the President would
be no greater, and possibly less, than that caused by the impeachment
process."' 9  Indeed, one can assume that the duties of defending the
i9o Loftus & Yetter, supra note 23 ("Stumbo said prosecutors accepted the deal because
Judge Melcher ruled that Fletcher could not be prosecuted until leaving office. That could
have delayed a trial until 2011 if Fletcher had been re-elected").
19i Freedman, supra note 2, at 52.
192 Id. at n.133.
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President, much like defending the Governor, would fall in large part to
the chief executive's attorneys. Other than perhaps the requirement of
testimony, which would be applicable at either an impeachment or a criminal
trial, it does not appear that that two types of proceedings are particularly
distinguishable with respect to the amount of time each requires.
Just how similar impeachment trials are to normal criminal trials is one
of judgment, to be sure; and the scant number of impeachments of chief
executives at the federal level and in Kentucky makes this determination all
the more difficult. Certainly, a direct comparison of the time required of the
two has never been undertaken, so any comparison of the two proceedings
cannot escape the criticism of speculation; but it is nonetheless worthy of
brief consideration.
Obviously, the basic elements are very different: criminal trials take
place in courts, whereas the impeachment of the President or a governor
takes place in the legislature.'93 And, indeed, both with respect to the
impeachment trial of the President and the impeachment trial of the
Governor of Kentucky, there is very little constitutional evidence as to
what the particular procedures shall be, as both constitutions provide
little or no guidance.' However, both the United States Senate and the
Kentucky General Assembly have drafted impeachment rules that guide
the proceedings. 9 Even a cursory glance at these procedural rules indicates
that, though they do not perfectly mirror normal criminal trial procedure,
they indeed resemble the normal processes that encompass a criminal
trial. 9 6 In sum, it does not appear, at least on the face of these rules, that
193 The impeachment trial of a President takes place in the United States Senate, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, and is presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. Id. In Kentucky, the impeachment trial of the Governor is likewise conducted in the
Kentucky Senate, but there is no indication of who is to preside over the impeachment trial.
Ky. CONST. § 67.
194 For a discussion of the overall lack of guidance provided by the federal Constitution
as to the impeachment trial of the President, see Michael E Williams, Rehnquist's Renunciation:
The Chief Justice's Constitutional Duty to "Preside" Over Impeachment Trials, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 457,
462 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court had deemed the issue a non-justiciable political
one). Kentucky's constitution provides no more guidance than the federal Constitution, and
ultimately even less in not appointing a particular officer to preside over the proceedings. Ky.
CONST. §§ 66-68.
195 For federal impeachment rules, see Jurist, Rules of Procedure and Practice in The
Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/rules.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2007). In Kentucky, the rules for impeachment procedure are governed by statute. See
generally Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.020-.055 (West 2006).
196 For example, the presiding officer at the impeachment of the President (being the
Chief Justice) "may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions
of relevancy, materiality, and redundancy of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling
shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some Member of the Senate shall ask that
a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision
without debate; or he may at his option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a
vote of the Members of the Senate. Upon all such questions the vote shall be taken in accor-
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an impeachment proceeding would present any less of an imposition than
an actual criminal trial. If this is an accurate conclusion, then the entire
foundation of the court's belief in the necessity of temporary immunity
falls by the wayside.'97
CONCLUSION
If Kentucky is ever again faced with the indictment of its Governor,
the best-case scenario will be a resolution of the immunity issue by the
Kentucky Supreme Court. Undoubtedly, given the existing Kentucky
Supreme Court dicta and the events that unfolded in the Fletcher case, this
argument will be made, providing ample opportunity for such a resolution.
What is clear is that the decision for the Supreme Court should be a
relatively easy one. There is simply no support for the doctrine of temporary
executive immunity from prosecution in Kentucky constitutional orcommon
law, and there is no analogous precedent for it in federal law. Furthermore,
such a decision would place Kentucky in an unprecedented and likely
unwelcome position relative to every state that has faced the indictment of
a sitting governor; and any other states that ultimately face such a situation
will almost certainly reach the same conclusion as Kentucky's sister
states. Finally, though not the primary focus of this Note, the very fact
that Kentucky's constitution provides for an *impeachment" trial of the
Governor indicates strongly that similar proceedings in the criminal courts,
being likely no greater of an imposition, are not constitutionally prohibited.
dance with the Standing Rules of the Senate." Jurist, supra note 195. Indeed, if anything, the
requirement that a ruling on evidence be submitted to the vote of the Senate in the event that
a presiding officer's ruling is challenged would presumably require more time than a normal
criminal trial. Furthermore, and similar to a normal trial, impeachment trials allow for exami-
nation and cross-examination of witnesses. Id. And, much as in a criminal trial, "[the person
impeached shall then be called to appear and answer the articles of impeachment against
him" with the option of sending a legal representative in his place. Id. In Kentucky, the
procedures are at least as stringent (if not as fully described), in that the individual subject to
the articles of impeachment is summoned in the same manner as in the United States Senate,
and in the same manner as in any normal trial court. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.040 (West zoo6).
("The accused shall be summoned by precept, issued by the clerk of the Senate, to appear on
that day. The precept shall be served in person, or a copy left at his residence with a member
of his family over the age of sixteen (16) years, together with a copy of the impeachment").
Indeed, the Kentucky rules make clear that "A witness ... summoned [to the impeachment
proceedings] shall receive the same compensation, and have the same privilege in going, re-
maining and returning, as a witness in Circuit Court," Id., indicating a clear intent to make
the trial component of the impeachment process at least marginally similar to the process in
a normal criminal trial.
197 This is particularly the case where, as noted supra notes 65-75 and accompanying
text, an impeachment proceeding is not required to be conducted as a prerequisite to criminal
prosecution under Kentucky's constitution. Were it necessary that an impeachment trial be
held before a criminal prosecution is conducted, then the duplicity of the proceedings might
better support an argument that the prosecution would unduly infringe upon the Governor's
time.
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As such, like all citizens of the Commonwealth, if indicted, the Governor
should be required to stand trial in a timely fashion.

